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12. Mark Blaug on the historiography of
economics
John B. Davis*
In the face of ideas, many economists are simply philistines, like troglodytes
listening to a Beethoven quartet and asking why the four players seem to be
unable to bow in unison. (Blaug 1994, p. 18)
12.1 INTRODUCTION: THE CONTEXT AND BLAUG’S
RESPONSE
Mark Blaug was a highly accomplished and influential historian of
economic thought and economic methodologist who re-thought his views
about the historiography of economics late in his career in connection
with his increased concern over the declining place of the history of
economic thought in the economics profession in the 1990s (Blaug
2001). Indeed he was provoked to reflect again upon the historiography
of economics by the stated and implicit views on the subject held by
many non-historian economists, which had emerged as their grounds for
justifying the expulsion and near exclusion of the history of economics
from the doctoral curriculum in most American universities by the end of
the decade. Though many non-historians supported or acquiesced in this
development for reasons often unrelated to their views about the history
of economics, such as their desire to increase the time students devoted
to training in mathematics and econometrics, their willingness to sacrifice
the history of economic thought effectively led them into arguing that the
field had no significant value for economics as a science. This entailed a
particular view of the historiography of economics, specifically, a com
bination of two related propositions: (1) the Whig idea that science
always makes progress which renders past ‘knowledge’ irrelevant to
current knowledge, and (2) the view that progress in economics as a
science consists in analytical achievements which are by nature strongly
separable from their origins and manner of development. Thus to combat
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the profession’s stance toward the history of economics, Blaug needed to
be able to explain why this particular historiographic view of economics
was mistaken. But this proved an especially difficult task for him
personally, because he had held historiographic views earlier in his career
that were not far removed from the positions he had since found he
wanted to reject. This chapter seeks to explain how he pulled off the
move from his earlier to his later view, and thereby set out his final
understanding of the historiography of economics as the methodology of
the history of economics.
The chapter argues that the key to the change in Blaug’s thinking and
critique of the standard Whig (or, as we will see rational reconstruction
ist) historiography was the two connected positions he adopted which
concerned the growth of knowledge. On the one hand, he turned
economists’ own market theory tools against them in using an economics
of scientific knowledge approach to argue that the ‘marketplace of ideas’
was neither competitive nor efficient in regard to the production of
economic knowledge. From this he was able to argue that the way in
which economics developed as a science inevitably involved loss of
content, thus undermining the steady progress idea associated with the
Whig view, and allowing him to define a role for the history of economic
thought in advancing scientific knowledge. On the other hand, he adopted
a particular conception of competition, namely, that competition is a
process rather than an end state in order to make a case for saying that
economic knowledge is path-dependent, by which he meant that eco
nomic knowledge at any one point in time depended crucially upon what
had previously occurred along the path economists had until then
pursued. This then went against the idea that economics amounted to a
succession of separable analytic achievements, and justified an essen
tially evolutionary view of knowledge and science, which accordingly
gave historians of economics, with what he saw as their comparative
intellectual advantage — a capacity to grasp the depth and breadth of
complex interconnections in intellectual history
— an important place in
advancing the science of economics.
This chapter seeks to explain the genesis and ultimate nature of
Blaug’s historiographic thinking, first, by reviewing his response to the
Whig view held implicitly or openly by most non-historian economists in
their attitude toward the history of economics — one which in a number of
respects he had at one time shared — and second, by showing how his
later evolutionary view of the science of economics led to an altogether
different historiographic view which sustained an important role for
historians of economics in the development of the field. The second
section of the chapter begins by discussing Blaug’s response to standard
historiography in terms of the distinction between rational reconstruc
dons and historical reconstructions of the past. In his first major
discussion of the subject — recalling his own recent practice as an
historian (Blaug 1985) — Blaug had expressed a fairly strong preference
for rational reconstructions, and had also been quite skeptical about
whether historical reconstructions were even viable (Blaug 1990). In his
second major discussion of historiography, however, he reversed himself,
and expressed serious doubts about what rational reconstructions achieve,
while also making an argument for historical reconstructions (Blaug
2001). To more fully explain this change in position, the third section
lays out Blaug’s economics of scientific knowledge argument that the
marketplace of ideas is inefficient, implying that the method of rational
reconstruction itself is inefficient, and then goes on to explain how he
used his process view of competition to take an evolutionary view of the
history of economics as path-dependent. The fourth section makes two
comments on Blaug’s mature view, addressing the role that his ‘lost
content’ assumption plays in evolutionary theory in general, and examin
ing the extent to which his view encounters the problem of reflexivity
associated with economics’ sociology of scientific knowledge explan
ations. The fifth section concludes with a discussion of the implications
of Blaug’s view for the status of the history of economic thought field in
the economics profession, particularly with respect to how historians
might make the issue of change in economics central to the defense of
their field.
12.2 RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTIONS VERSUS
HISTORICAL RECONSTRUCTIONS: A CHANGE
OF POSITION
Blaug drew on the philosopher Richard Rorty (1984) for the distinction
between rational reconstructions and historical reconstructions of past
ideas (Blaug 1990, 200l).1 Both, Blaug emphasized, were inevitably
types of reconstructions for the reason that (here he cited the thinking of
Jacques Derrida and Michael Foucault), ‘all texts of the past need to be
reconstructed because they do not speak with one voice and are never
unambiguous’ (Blaug 2001, p. 151). The relevant question regarding the
method of reconstructing the past, he rather argued, was ‘how are we to
do so: in the light of all that we now know or as faithfully as possible to
the times in which they were written’ — where the former counted as a
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the profession’s stance toward the history of economics, Blaug needed to
be able to explain why this particular historiographic view of economics
was mistaken. But this proved an especially difficult task for him
personally, because he had held historiographic views earlier in his career
that were not far removed from the positions he had since found he
wanted to reject. This chapter seeks to explain how he pulled off the
move from his earlier to his later view, and thereby set out his final
understanding of the historiography of economics as the methodology of
the history of economics.
The chapter argues that the key to the change in Blaug’s thinking and
critique of the standard Whig (or, as we will see rational reconstruction
ist) historiography was the two connected positions he adopted which
concerned the growth of knowledge. On the one hand, he turned
economists’ own market theory tools against them in using an economics
of scientific knowledge approach to argue that the ‘marketplace of ideas’
was neither competitive nor efficient in regard to the production of
economic knowledge. From this he was able to argue that the way in
which economics developed as a science inevitably involved loss of
content, thus undermining the steady progress idea associated with the
Whig view, and allowing him to define a role for the history of economic
thought in advancing scientific knowledge. On the other hand, he adopted
a particular conception of competition, namely, that competition is a
process rather than an end state in order to make a case for saying that
economic knowledge is path-dependent, by which he meant that eco
nomic knowledge at any one point in time depended crucially upon what
had previously occurred along the path economists had until then
pursued. This then went against the idea that economics amounted to a
succession of separable analytic achievements, and justified an essen
tially evolutionary view of knowledge and science, which accordingly
gave historians of economics, with what he saw as their comparative
intellectual advantage — a capacity to grasp the depth and breadth of
complex interconnections in intellectual history
— an important place in
advancing the science of economics.
This chapter seeks to explain the genesis and ultimate nature of
Blaug’s historiographic thinking, first, by reviewing his response to the
Whig view held implicitly or openly by most non-historian economists in
their attitude toward the history of economics — one which in a number of
respects he had at one time shared — and second, by showing how his
later evolutionary view of the science of economics led to an altogether
different historiographic view which sustained an important role for
historians of economics in the development of the field. The second
section of the chapter begins by discussing Blaug’s response to standard
historiography in terms of the distinction between rational reconstruc
dons and historical reconstructions of the past. In his first major
discussion of the subject — recalling his own recent practice as an
historian (Blaug 1985) — Blaug had expressed a fairly strong preference
for rational reconstructions, and had also been quite skeptical about
whether historical reconstructions were even viable (Blaug 1990). In his
second major discussion of historiography, however, he reversed himself,
and expressed serious doubts about what rational reconstructions achieve,
while also making an argument for historical reconstructions (Blaug
2001). To more fully explain this change in position, the third section
lays out Blaug’s economics of scientific knowledge argument that the
marketplace of ideas is inefficient, implying that the method of rational
reconstruction itself is inefficient, and then goes on to explain how he
used his process view of competition to take an evolutionary view of the
history of economics as path-dependent. The fourth section makes two
comments on Blaug’s mature view, addressing the role that his ‘lost
content’ assumption plays in evolutionary theory in general, and examin
ing the extent to which his view encounters the problem of reflexivity
associated with economics’ sociology of scientific knowledge explan
ations. The fifth section concludes with a discussion of the implications
of Blaug’s view for the status of the history of economic thought field in
the economics profession, particularly with respect to how historians
might make the issue of change in economics central to the defense of
their field.
12.2 RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTIONS VERSUS
HISTORICAL RECONSTRUCTIONS: A CHANGE
OF POSITION
Blaug drew on the philosopher Richard Rorty (1984) for the distinction
between rational reconstructions and historical reconstructions of past
ideas (Blaug 1990, 200l).1 Both, Blaug emphasized, were inevitably
types of reconstructions for the reason that (here he cited the thinking of
Jacques Derrida and Michael Foucault), ‘all texts of the past need to be
reconstructed because they do not speak with one voice and are never
unambiguous’ (Blaug 2001, p. 151). The relevant question regarding the
method of reconstructing the past, he rather argued, was ‘how are we to
do so: in the light of all that we now know or as faithfully as possible to
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rational reconstruction and the latter counted as an historical reconstruc
tion (ibid.). Ostensibly the difference was that in the former case the
present was one’s point of entry, while in the latter case it was the past.
Given, then, that each had a certain prima facie plausibility, how was one
to decide between the two methods?
In his first discussion of rational and historical reconstruction (1990),
Blaug had relied on a distinction between absolutism and relativism
— an
alternative but related distinction which he had employed in his Eco
nomic Theory in Retrospect history of economics (for example, Blaug
1985, pp. 1—2) — to argue that there were important asymmetries between
rational and historical reconstructions which tended to favor the former
over the latter. First, ‘we can never forget what we know, so that some
version of “absolutism” is implied in every attempt to examine some text
of the past’, where by absolutism he meant ‘the tendency to judge past
economic theories by the standards of modem economic theory’. Second,
if we take relativism to be the polar opposite of absolutism, then
“absolutism” is more defensible than “relativism”, particularly as strict
“relativism” is logically impossible’ (Blaug 1990, p. 28). He then went on
to present Paul Samuelson’s (1974b) unhesitating defense of rational
reconstruction as the clearest possible statement of what that method
involved (Blaug 1990, p. 30), and drew up the balance sheet for the two
methods in a way that gave mixed but generally favorable support to
rational reconstructions, and expressed serious doubts about what histor
ical reconstructions could achieve.
I conclude that rational reconstructions are perfectly legitimate, although
whether they are illuminating depends on the case in question. As for
historical reconstructions, they are inherently problematic. Strictly speaking
they are impossible because they presume that the past can be recalled
without knowledge of the present; no adult can be expected to recall his
childhood as if adulthood had never happened. (Blaug 1990, p. 30)2
Thus at best Blaug was ambivalent, aware from Rorty and others that a
case for historical reconstructions might be made, but unclear about how
they were to be reasonably done, and thus inclined to defend rational
reconstructions as ‘legitimate’ though perhaps not always ‘illuminating’.
Accordingly, when he set out to rethink his views on historiography in
economics some ten years later, having experienced how a general
acceptance of the method of rational reconstruction in the intervening
time had worked against the history of economics, he found himself in a
quandary. ‘The temptation to choose the first alternative is almost
irresistible’ (Blaug 2001, p. 151), he still admitted, but one also needed to
see that this led to the unacceptable conclusion, as he had previously put
it, that ‘there is really no point to the history of economic thought; why
study what Pigou once contemptuously called “the wrong opinions of
dead men” (Blaug 1990, p. 28). Defending the method of rational
reconstruction, that is, would only confirm the negative verdict of
non-historians regarding the history of economic thought that it was
simply an idle enterprise outside the bounds of economic science. Was
there thus a stronger case, he then asked himself, for understanding the
historiography of economics as historical reconstruction, despite its
seemingly problematic nature? And was there something objectionable
about rational reconstructions that he had previously overlooked?3
To uncover his earlier unacknowledged hesitations about rational
reconstruction, let us step aside from the abstract epistemological argu
ments Blaug originally advanced regarding the nature of the two meth
ods, and rather look at how he first saw them applied in practice in
connection with the exchange between Samuelson and William Baumol,
which had led to Samuelson’s characterization of the method of rational
reconstruction. There in fact we see a different appreciation of historical
reconstructions associated with the emphasis which Blaug sees Baumol
putting on the perspective of the historical economist. The starting point
in the exchange had been Samuelson’s (1971) interpretation and analysis
of Karl Marx’s famous transformation problem. Samuelson’s position
was that Marx had simply failed mathematically to simultaneously
transform surplus value into profits and labor values into prices. Baumol
(1 974a) responded to Samuelson that Marx was chiefly interested in the
transformation of surplus value into profits (in order to explain the
origins of profit in labor exploitation), and that the transformation of
labor values into prices had only been of secondary interest to him. So
Baumol had argued that mathematical adequacy was not the point in
understanding Marx’s transformation problem. Samuelson (1974a) none
theless replied that Marx had still failed at what a comprehensive
transformation required, leading Baumol (1974b) to say, yes, but that it
had rather been his objective to determine what Marx had intended to do,
implying that this was important for understanding Marx and the
transformation problem.
Thus as Blaug understood the exchange, the line drawn between the
two was over whether economists’ intentions and objectives were relevant
to understanding their thinking, with Baumol arguing, essentially as an
historical reconstructionist, that there were advantages to having this
further information apart from how we might view the past from the
perspective of contemporary theory. Samuelson thus found himself
arguing not only for mathematical adequacy but also that nothing goes
missing when we ignore economists’ intentions and objectives. One
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Given, then, that each had a certain prima facie plausibility, how was one
to decide between the two methods?
In his first discussion of rational and historical reconstruction (1990),
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— an
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if we take relativism to be the polar opposite of absolutism, then
“absolutism” is more defensible than “relativism”, particularly as strict
“relativism” is logically impossible’ (Blaug 1990, p. 28). He then went on
to present Paul Samuelson’s (1974b) unhesitating defense of rational
reconstruction as the clearest possible statement of what that method
involved (Blaug 1990, p. 30), and drew up the balance sheet for the two
methods in a way that gave mixed but generally favorable support to
rational reconstructions, and expressed serious doubts about what histor
ical reconstructions could achieve.
I conclude that rational reconstructions are perfectly legitimate, although
whether they are illuminating depends on the case in question. As for
historical reconstructions, they are inherently problematic. Strictly speaking
they are impossible because they presume that the past can be recalled
without knowledge of the present; no adult can be expected to recall his
childhood as if adulthood had never happened. (Blaug 1990, p. 30)2
Thus at best Blaug was ambivalent, aware from Rorty and others that a
case for historical reconstructions might be made, but unclear about how
they were to be reasonably done, and thus inclined to defend rational
reconstructions as ‘legitimate’ though perhaps not always ‘illuminating’.
Accordingly, when he set out to rethink his views on historiography in
economics some ten years later, having experienced how a general
acceptance of the method of rational reconstruction in the intervening
time had worked against the history of economics, he found himself in a
quandary. ‘The temptation to choose the first alternative is almost
irresistible’ (Blaug 2001, p. 151), he still admitted, but one also needed to
see that this led to the unacceptable conclusion, as he had previously put
it, that ‘there is really no point to the history of economic thought; why
study what Pigou once contemptuously called “the wrong opinions of
dead men” (Blaug 1990, p. 28). Defending the method of rational
reconstruction, that is, would only confirm the negative verdict of
non-historians regarding the history of economic thought that it was
simply an idle enterprise outside the bounds of economic science. Was
there thus a stronger case, he then asked himself, for understanding the
historiography of economics as historical reconstruction, despite its
seemingly problematic nature? And was there something objectionable
about rational reconstructions that he had previously overlooked?3
To uncover his earlier unacknowledged hesitations about rational
reconstruction, let us step aside from the abstract epistemological argu
ments Blaug originally advanced regarding the nature of the two meth
ods, and rather look at how he first saw them applied in practice in
connection with the exchange between Samuelson and William Baumol,
which had led to Samuelson’s characterization of the method of rational
reconstruction. There in fact we see a different appreciation of historical
reconstructions associated with the emphasis which Blaug sees Baumol
putting on the perspective of the historical economist. The starting point
in the exchange had been Samuelson’s (1971) interpretation and analysis
of Karl Marx’s famous transformation problem. Samuelson’s position
was that Marx had simply failed mathematically to simultaneously
transform surplus value into profits and labor values into prices. Baumol
(1 974a) responded to Samuelson that Marx was chiefly interested in the
transformation of surplus value into profits (in order to explain the
origins of profit in labor exploitation), and that the transformation of
labor values into prices had only been of secondary interest to him. So
Baumol had argued that mathematical adequacy was not the point in
understanding Marx’s transformation problem. Samuelson (1974a) none
theless replied that Marx had still failed at what a comprehensive
transformation required, leading Baumol (1974b) to say, yes, but that it
had rather been his objective to determine what Marx had intended to do,
implying that this was important for understanding Marx and the
transformation problem.
Thus as Blaug understood the exchange, the line drawn between the
two was over whether economists’ intentions and objectives were relevant
to understanding their thinking, with Baumol arguing, essentially as an
historical reconstructionist, that there were advantages to having this
further information apart from how we might view the past from the
perspective of contemporary theory. Samuelson thus found himself
arguing not only for mathematical adequacy but also that nothing goes
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could additionally argue on Samuelson’s side that one can never know
another’s intentions, and so they cannot be part of an explanation of
economic thinking,4 but this argument was really a back-up defense for
the position that economists’ intentions and objectives were simply
irrelevant, whether or not we could say what they were. We can see this
in the subsequent exchange of correspondence between Blaug, Samuel-
son, and Don Patinkin (Samuelson, Patinkin and Blaug 1991) where the
issue became whether a rational reconstruction could deviate from an
historical reconstruction. Samuelson’s prior position (1974b) had been
that all there could be was rational reconstruction, but having read
Blaug’s account of the exchange with Baumol he found himself on the
defensive with regard to whether a rational reconstruction might not be
faithful to, or ‘deviate’ from, an historical reconstruction. As he wrote to
Blaug: ‘Let’s accept for the sake of argument that in some instances a
“rational reconstruction” can deviate from a “historical reconstruction”
(Samuelson, Patinkin and Blaug 1991, p. 144). Thus he allowed that
there seemed to be something to historical reconstructions, even if one
preferred rational ones and did not know how to proceed with the other.
Rational reconstructions accordingly no longer unequivocally ruled the
roost. Blaug seized on this in his response to Samuelson, expanding on
Baumol’s point that knowing what economists meant to say was import
ant to understanding what they said: ‘Is [Hermann Heinrich] Gossen a
true forerunner of the Marginal Revolution? No, because no one read
him. It is not enough to have great ideas, as Schumpeter always said; you
have to get them across to your colleagues’ (Samuelson, Patinkin and
Blaug, 1991, pp. 148—9). That is, whatever the adequacy, mathematical or
otherwise, of Gossen’s thinking, we cannot say he was an early margin
alist, because marginalism only emerged as a distinct theoretical
approach when it was seen explicitly to be such by economists. So
knowing what economists think about what they were doing matters to
our understanding of what their thinking is.
Thus whereas before Blaug had regarded the method of rational
reconstruction as a straightforward, justifiable practice, and had doubts
about historical reconstruction, now it was not only clear he thought
historical reconstructions had certain advantages over rational ones, and
thus must have some sort of coherence, but he had begun to develop
doubts about the adequacy of rational reconstructions. Essentially he had
reversed his earlier view as a result of his further reflection on Samuel-
son’s statement regarding what the method of rational reconstruction
involved in light of the exchange with Baumol. The issue, moreover,
concerned what rational reconstructions left out or omitted as explan
ations which might be recovered through historical reconstructions. This
focus on omission points us towards the economics of scientific know
ledge argument Blaug was to subsequently make regarding the growth of
knowledge in economics.6
12.3 LOST CONTENT, THE ECONOMICS OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE, AND
PATH-DEPENDENCY IN THE HISTORY OF
ECONOMICS: AN EVOLUTIONARY VIEW
Sifting through the various reasons that he found had been given by
various authors for studying the history of economic thought (in ‘a
painfully defensive tone’), Blaug noted that infrequently mentioned was
the benefit of discovering ‘new’ and largely forgotten ideas, a prime
example being the rediscovery and rehabilitation of the Pareto optimality
concept in the 1930s after more than a quarter century of neglect (Blaug
2001, p. 148). That the profession was blind to this kind of loss of ideas
was due, he then argued, to the widely-held view that
the community of economists represents an approximately perfect market in
which new ideas are so efficiently transmitted in a communication network of
journals, books, seminars and conferences that there is no loss of significant
content. This view of an efficient marketplace of ideas implies that history of
economic thought can be safely neglected by modern economists, because
what is valuable in the ideas is fully contained in the present curriculum.
(Ibid.)
But this view of an efficient marketplace of ideas was in Blaug’s view as
indefensible as it was accepted.
The objections against taking the market of ideas as anything other
than a stimulating metaphor are so obvious as hardly to require discus
sion. In particular, markets as arbiters of quality in scholarly (or any
other kind of) goods are excessively subject to bandwagon and snob
effects (ibid. pp. 148—9).
The implication of saying that the marketplace of ideas was not
perfectly competitive and efficient, then, was that there was there was
always a risk of ‘loss of content’ in current activity as economists
followed popular trends. Past ideas that were of continuing value were
then regularly discarded, meaning that current ideas were commonly less
original and well-founded than generally believed. This was directly
contrary to the Whig idea of progress in science and the notion that the
advance of economics involved a succession of distinct analytical
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could additionally argue on Samuelson’s side that one can never know
another’s intentions, and so they cannot be part of an explanation of
economic thinking,4 but this argument was really a back-up defense for
the position that economists’ intentions and objectives were simply
irrelevant, whether or not we could say what they were. We can see this
in the subsequent exchange of correspondence between Blaug, Samuel-
son, and Don Patinkin (Samuelson, Patinkin and Blaug 1991) where the
issue became whether a rational reconstruction could deviate from an
historical reconstruction. Samuelson’s prior position (1974b) had been
that all there could be was rational reconstruction, but having read
Blaug’s account of the exchange with Baumol he found himself on the
defensive with regard to whether a rational reconstruction might not be
faithful to, or ‘deviate’ from, an historical reconstruction. As he wrote to
Blaug: ‘Let’s accept for the sake of argument that in some instances a
“rational reconstruction” can deviate from a “historical reconstruction”
(Samuelson, Patinkin and Blaug 1991, p. 144). Thus he allowed that
there seemed to be something to historical reconstructions, even if one
preferred rational ones and did not know how to proceed with the other.
Rational reconstructions accordingly no longer unequivocally ruled the
roost. Blaug seized on this in his response to Samuelson, expanding on
Baumol’s point that knowing what economists meant to say was import
ant to understanding what they said: ‘Is [Hermann Heinrich] Gossen a
true forerunner of the Marginal Revolution? No, because no one read
him. It is not enough to have great ideas, as Schumpeter always said; you
have to get them across to your colleagues’ (Samuelson, Patinkin and
Blaug, 1991, pp. 148—9). That is, whatever the adequacy, mathematical or
otherwise, of Gossen’s thinking, we cannot say he was an early margin
alist, because marginalism only emerged as a distinct theoretical
approach when it was seen explicitly to be such by economists. So
knowing what economists think about what they were doing matters to
our understanding of what their thinking is.
Thus whereas before Blaug had regarded the method of rational
reconstruction as a straightforward, justifiable practice, and had doubts
about historical reconstruction, now it was not only clear he thought
historical reconstructions had certain advantages over rational ones, and
thus must have some sort of coherence, but he had begun to develop
doubts about the adequacy of rational reconstructions. Essentially he had
reversed his earlier view as a result of his further reflection on Samuel-
son’s statement regarding what the method of rational reconstruction
involved in light of the exchange with Baumol. The issue, moreover,
concerned what rational reconstructions left out or omitted as explan
ations which might be recovered through historical reconstructions. This
focus on omission points us towards the economics of scientific know
ledge argument Blaug was to subsequently make regarding the growth of
knowledge in economics.6
12.3 LOST CONTENT, THE ECONOMICS OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE, AND
PATH-DEPENDENCY IN THE HISTORY OF
ECONOMICS: AN EVOLUTIONARY VIEW
Sifting through the various reasons that he found had been given by
various authors for studying the history of economic thought (in ‘a
painfully defensive tone’), Blaug noted that infrequently mentioned was
the benefit of discovering ‘new’ and largely forgotten ideas, a prime
example being the rediscovery and rehabilitation of the Pareto optimality
concept in the 1930s after more than a quarter century of neglect (Blaug
2001, p. 148). That the profession was blind to this kind of loss of ideas
was due, he then argued, to the widely-held view that
the community of economists represents an approximately perfect market in
which new ideas are so efficiently transmitted in a communication network of
journals, books, seminars and conferences that there is no loss of significant
content. This view of an efficient marketplace of ideas implies that history of
economic thought can be safely neglected by modern economists, because
what is valuable in the ideas is fully contained in the present curriculum.
(Ibid.)
But this view of an efficient marketplace of ideas was in Blaug’s view as
indefensible as it was accepted.
The objections against taking the market of ideas as anything other
than a stimulating metaphor are so obvious as hardly to require discus
sion. In particular, markets as arbiters of quality in scholarly (or any
other kind of) goods are excessively subject to bandwagon and snob
effects (ibid. pp. 148—9).
The implication of saying that the marketplace of ideas was not
perfectly competitive and efficient, then, was that there was there was
always a risk of ‘loss of content’ in current activity as economists
followed popular trends. Past ideas that were of continuing value were
then regularly discarded, meaning that current ideas were commonly less
original and well-founded than generally believed. This was directly
contrary to the Whig idea of progress in science and the notion that the
advance of economics involved a succession of distinct analytical
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achievements. The method of rational reconstruction, it followed, was
itself an inefficient practice, and this suggested that rather some combin
ation of historical and rational reconstruction was needed to generate an
efficient scholarly production process.
Blaug thus took it as a given that the growth of knowledge ought to be
understood as an economic process, one moreover which could be
reasonably well explained with conventional neoclassical concepts such
as efficiency and competition. The problem with the profession’s aban
donment of the history of economics was accordingly that economists
had failed to use their analysis to understand their own profession. That
is, they did a poor economics of scientific knowledge, and therefore
reached the wrong conclusions about the economics production process,
the history of economic thought, and the growth of knowledge in
economics. This critique was different from ones advanced by many
other historians of economics who commonly emphasized the intrinsic
value of historical reflection, and were mostly not inclined to use an
economics of scientific knowledge approach. However, this is not to say
that Blaug as an intellectual historian was unsympathetic to more
traditional sorts of arguments about the nature of knowledge and its
development:
Knowledge has multi-dimensional depth as well as breadth, and some of the
dimensions of economic knowledge include analysis, data, history, institutions
and policy questions. There is a raw kind of conceptual depth where concepts
are only understood when they are differentiated relative to other closely
related ones so that the extent of one’s knowledge depends on the fineness
with which one can differentiate. In different contexts, these dimensions of
knowledge vary in importance. (Ibid. p. 150)
But to deliver a satisfactory critique of standard historiography and the
method of rational reconstruction, Blaug needed to employ an argument
that operated upon economists’ own terrain which they would have to
answer but which he believed they could not reasonably rebut. It was one
thing, however, to successfully attack rational reconstruction. To go
further and advance a positive case for historical reconstruction based on
its own merits he needed to go beyond simple marketplace of ideas
formulations. This brings us to his argument for a process-conception of
competition.
An important emphasis in Blaug’s later research in the history of
economics concerned how the concept of competition had been under
stood in the past, and how the modern view of the concept departed from
earlier thinking.7 The modem view of competition was what he referred
to as an end-state conception (Blaug 1997). A good part of the motivation
behind the adoption of this conception was its tractability for math
ematical analysis. But earlier economists had reasoned in terms of a
process conception which emphasized the conditions and dynamics of
competition.
What Adam Smith meant by competition is what modern Austrians call
‘process competition’. What we nowadays call competition was for him
‘the obvious and simple system of natural liberty’, meaning an absence
of artificial constraints and, in particular, restraints on free entry into
industries and occupations. Neither competition nor monopoly was a
matter of the number of sellers in the market (Blaug 2001, p. 153).
Of course contemporary economists might well argue that what Blaug
called a process conception of competition was simply a primitive
attempt to understand the formalizable end-state conception, but here
Blaug used the process idea to counter this potential response and
simultaneously defend the method of historical reconstruction.
Thus, returning to the problem of ‘How one can justify the study of the
history of economic thought as a specialization within economics’, he
offered what he regarded as his ‘own knock-down argument’.
It is this: No ideas or theory in economics, physics, chemistry, biology,
philosophy and even mathematics is ever thoroughly understood except as the
end-product of a slice of history, the result of some previous intellectual
development. (Ibid., p. 156)
Here what he says is that any end-state or end-product judgment is by
itself incomplete as a representation of the economy, and thus inseparable
conceptually from the process or development which precedes and
produces it. One cannot, then, rationally reconstruct the concept of
competition solely in end-state terms, because, despite their desire to
formalize, economists know that competitive end states are always the
result of processes that generate them. It follows that if we see economics
as a marketplace if ideas, as he believed economists should, rational
reconstructions, as an end-state type of thinking, must always include
historical reconstructions as a process type of thinking, in order to be
complete.
From this conclusion, Blaug went on to characterize his view of the
growth of knowledge in economics using a key evolutionary concept:
path-dependency.
Economic knowledge is path-dependent. What we now know about the
economic system is not something we have just discovered, but it is the sum
of all discoveries, insights and false starts in the past ... . There is nothing
predetermined about our current theories and if years ago, economics had
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achievements. The method of rational reconstruction, it followed, was
itself an inefficient practice, and this suggested that rather some combin
ation of historical and rational reconstruction was needed to generate an
efficient scholarly production process.
Blaug thus took it as a given that the growth of knowledge ought to be
understood as an economic process, one moreover which could be
reasonably well explained with conventional neoclassical concepts such
as efficiency and competition. The problem with the profession’s aban
donment of the history of economics was accordingly that economists
had failed to use their analysis to understand their own profession. That
is, they did a poor economics of scientific knowledge, and therefore
reached the wrong conclusions about the economics production process,
the history of economic thought, and the growth of knowledge in
economics. This critique was different from ones advanced by many
other historians of economics who commonly emphasized the intrinsic
value of historical reflection, and were mostly not inclined to use an
economics of scientific knowledge approach. However, this is not to say
that Blaug as an intellectual historian was unsympathetic to more
traditional sorts of arguments about the nature of knowledge and its
development:
Knowledge has multi-dimensional depth as well as breadth, and some of the
dimensions of economic knowledge include analysis, data, history, institutions
and policy questions. There is a raw kind of conceptual depth where concepts
are only understood when they are differentiated relative to other closely
related ones so that the extent of one’s knowledge depends on the fineness
with which one can differentiate. In different contexts, these dimensions of
knowledge vary in importance. (Ibid. p. 150)
But to deliver a satisfactory critique of standard historiography and the
method of rational reconstruction, Blaug needed to employ an argument
that operated upon economists’ own terrain which they would have to
answer but which he believed they could not reasonably rebut. It was one
thing, however, to successfully attack rational reconstruction. To go
further and advance a positive case for historical reconstruction based on
its own merits he needed to go beyond simple marketplace of ideas
formulations. This brings us to his argument for a process-conception of
competition.
An important emphasis in Blaug’s later research in the history of
economics concerned how the concept of competition had been under
stood in the past, and how the modern view of the concept departed from
earlier thinking.7 The modem view of competition was what he referred
to as an end-state conception (Blaug 1997). A good part of the motivation
behind the adoption of this conception was its tractability for math
ematical analysis. But earlier economists had reasoned in terms of a
process conception which emphasized the conditions and dynamics of
competition.
What Adam Smith meant by competition is what modern Austrians call
‘process competition’. What we nowadays call competition was for him
‘the obvious and simple system of natural liberty’, meaning an absence
of artificial constraints and, in particular, restraints on free entry into
industries and occupations. Neither competition nor monopoly was a
matter of the number of sellers in the market (Blaug 2001, p. 153).
Of course contemporary economists might well argue that what Blaug
called a process conception of competition was simply a primitive
attempt to understand the formalizable end-state conception, but here
Blaug used the process idea to counter this potential response and
simultaneously defend the method of historical reconstruction.
Thus, returning to the problem of ‘How one can justify the study of the
history of economic thought as a specialization within economics’, he
offered what he regarded as his ‘own knock-down argument’.
It is this: No ideas or theory in economics, physics, chemistry, biology,
philosophy and even mathematics is ever thoroughly understood except as the
end-product of a slice of history, the result of some previous intellectual
development. (Ibid., p. 156)
Here what he says is that any end-state or end-product judgment is by
itself incomplete as a representation of the economy, and thus inseparable
conceptually from the process or development which precedes and
produces it. One cannot, then, rationally reconstruct the concept of
competition solely in end-state terms, because, despite their desire to
formalize, economists know that competitive end states are always the
result of processes that generate them. It follows that if we see economics
as a marketplace if ideas, as he believed economists should, rational
reconstructions, as an end-state type of thinking, must always include
historical reconstructions as a process type of thinking, in order to be
complete.
From this conclusion, Blaug went on to characterize his view of the
growth of knowledge in economics using a key evolutionary concept:
path-dependency.
Economic knowledge is path-dependent. What we now know about the
economic system is not something we have just discovered, but it is the sum
of all discoveries, insights and false starts in the past ... . There is nothing
predetermined about our current theories and if years ago, economics had
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taken another turn at a critical nodal point, we would today be advocating a
different theory. (Ibid.)
Here Blaug’s view of path-dependency is subtle. It is not just that there is
always a chain of connection between the past and the present that we
must trace out in order to have the whole picture. That chain also
comprehends many paths not taken, blind alleys, and false starts, which
moreover are from time to time revived and re-explored, thus adding
cycles of explanation into the history of economics, and undermining the
Whig idea of linear progress.8 In this way, then, Blaug paints in
broad-brush terms the picture of an evolutionary system in which many
competing ideas and theories interact with one another, with some
prevailing at one point in time and others prevailing at others. Those
ideas that lose their temporary advantage may reappear in the future, or
even cease to have any significant further role in economics. He
consequently goes well beyond the traditional marketplace of ideas
metaphor, while still sustaining the idea that competition is a regulating
force in a complex evolving world of interdependent theories and ideas.
Blaug contrasted this vision of the history of economics with a more
familiar one held by many economists and perhaps some historians of
economics as well.
Conversations with other economists have brought home to me that a widely
held impression views the history of economic thought as a sort of intellectual
archaeology: it may turn up new manuscripts and documents from time to
time, but it itself remains unaffected by these discoveries and, unlike other
branches of economics, shows no development or progress over time. This is
a totally misleading impression. (Ibid., p. 157)
He proceeded to review a number of recent developments in the history
of economic thought demonstrating that the status and meaning of many
past doctrines was typically up-ended by recent research. This showed
that the rational reconstructionist view cotild not stand since how current
theory related to the past was always in jeopardy when the past was in a
state of continual transformation. The archaeological view, in effect, was
thus an expression of the rational reconstruction view that economics is a
succession of separable analytical achievements that proceeded without
effects on past economics, but it was increasingly evident that the idea of
rational reconstruction itself was incoherent, rather than the reverse as he
had originally been tempted to think.
Blaug thus moved his thinking about the historiography of economics
a considerable distance from his earlier views. He also made a case for
the place of the history of economics in the economics profession that
was directly contrary to the conventional view. Whereas the history of
economics was an incidental, leisure activity in the eyes of most
economists, Blaug’s argument was that it was absolutely central to the
development of economics since one could not say what constituted a
scientific advance if one could not appraise new developments in terms
of how they related to past ideas and theories. Moreover, to complicate
matters, what the history of economics amounted to exhibited change no
less than the research frontier of current economics. Yet needless to say,
this argument about the history of economics or economics as a whole
has not carried the day for many economists. Perhaps this is because it
was framed as a defense of the history of economic thought rather than
as an explanation of the science of economics per se, but in any event it
can be argued that Blaug’s evolutionary view of economics may have
begun to acquire new relevance in light of the fact that an increasing
number of economists are now willing to say that economics research
appears to be evolving in a variety of new directions. Thus it is fair to
ask, what does Blaug’s evolutionary view tell us about the dynamic
nature of economics today? In the section that follows I address this
question by offering an interpretation of his ‘lost content’ assumption and
j by commenting on the problem of reflexivity it raises.
12.4 THE EVOLUTIONARY VIEW OF ECONOMICS:
TWO ISSUES
Blaug’s immediate motivation for saying that economics regularly loses
what turns out to be valuable past content (as in the example of the
rehabilitation of the Pareto optimality concept) was to show that rational
reconstructions are inefficient. Pareto efficient states of affairs, of course,
are those in which gains are unequivocal improvements, and nothing
valued is sacrificed to produce them. Conversely Pareto inefficient states
of affairs are those in which gains come at the expense of losses, and are
consequently not unequivocal improvements, in this case where the
development of new ideas and theories in economics is at the cost of
abandoning earlier ideas and theories that remain valuable.
Thus to argue that economics loses valuable content demonstrates not
only that the Whig view of steady progress is mistaken, but that it is so
because it fails to satisfy the Pareto standard. Again, Blaug’s strategy was
to turn economists’ own tools against them on the subject of their rational
reconstructionist view of the history of economic thought.
But in making this fairly conventional argument he committed himself
— it seems at least in part unintentionally
— to the view that economics as
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taken another turn at a critical nodal point, we would today be advocating a
different theory. (Ibid.)
Here Blaug’s view of path-dependency is subtle. It is not just that there is
always a chain of connection between the past and the present that we
must trace out in order to have the whole picture. That chain also
comprehends many paths not taken, blind alleys, and false starts, which
moreover are from time to time revived and re-explored, thus adding
cycles of explanation into the history of economics, and undermining the
Whig idea of linear progress.8 In this way, then, Blaug paints in
broad-brush terms the picture of an evolutionary system in which many
competing ideas and theories interact with one another, with some
prevailing at one point in time and others prevailing at others. Those
ideas that lose their temporary advantage may reappear in the future, or
even cease to have any significant further role in economics. He
consequently goes well beyond the traditional marketplace of ideas
metaphor, while still sustaining the idea that competition is a regulating
force in a complex evolving world of interdependent theories and ideas.
Blaug contrasted this vision of the history of economics with a more
familiar one held by many economists and perhaps some historians of
economics as well.
Conversations with other economists have brought home to me that a widely
held impression views the history of economic thought as a sort of intellectual
archaeology: it may turn up new manuscripts and documents from time to
time, but it itself remains unaffected by these discoveries and, unlike other
branches of economics, shows no development or progress over time. This is
a totally misleading impression. (Ibid., p. 157)
He proceeded to review a number of recent developments in the history
of economic thought demonstrating that the status and meaning of many
past doctrines was typically up-ended by recent research. This showed
that the rational reconstructionist view cotild not stand since how current
theory related to the past was always in jeopardy when the past was in a
state of continual transformation. The archaeological view, in effect, was
thus an expression of the rational reconstruction view that economics is a
succession of separable analytical achievements that proceeded without
effects on past economics, but it was increasingly evident that the idea of
rational reconstruction itself was incoherent, rather than the reverse as he
had originally been tempted to think.
Blaug thus moved his thinking about the historiography of economics
a considerable distance from his earlier views. He also made a case for
the place of the history of economics in the economics profession that
was directly contrary to the conventional view. Whereas the history of
economics was an incidental, leisure activity in the eyes of most
economists, Blaug’s argument was that it was absolutely central to the
development of economics since one could not say what constituted a
scientific advance if one could not appraise new developments in terms
of how they related to past ideas and theories. Moreover, to complicate
matters, what the history of economics amounted to exhibited change no
less than the research frontier of current economics. Yet needless to say,
this argument about the history of economics or economics as a whole
has not carried the day for many economists. Perhaps this is because it
was framed as a defense of the history of economic thought rather than
as an explanation of the science of economics per se, but in any event it
can be argued that Blaug’s evolutionary view of economics may have
begun to acquire new relevance in light of the fact that an increasing
number of economists are now willing to say that economics research
appears to be evolving in a variety of new directions. Thus it is fair to
ask, what does Blaug’s evolutionary view tell us about the dynamic
nature of economics today? In the section that follows I address this
question by offering an interpretation of his ‘lost content’ assumption and
j by commenting on the problem of reflexivity it raises.
12.4 THE EVOLUTIONARY VIEW OF ECONOMICS:
TWO ISSUES
Blaug’s immediate motivation for saying that economics regularly loses
what turns out to be valuable past content (as in the example of the
rehabilitation of the Pareto optimality concept) was to show that rational
reconstructions are inefficient. Pareto efficient states of affairs, of course,
are those in which gains are unequivocal improvements, and nothing
valued is sacrificed to produce them. Conversely Pareto inefficient states
of affairs are those in which gains come at the expense of losses, and are
consequently not unequivocal improvements, in this case where the
development of new ideas and theories in economics is at the cost of
abandoning earlier ideas and theories that remain valuable.
Thus to argue that economics loses valuable content demonstrates not
only that the Whig view of steady progress is mistaken, but that it is so
because it fails to satisfy the Pareto standard. Again, Blaug’s strategy was
to turn economists’ own tools against them on the subject of their rational
reconstructionist view of the history of economic thought.
But in making this fairly conventional argument he committed himself
— it seems at least in part unintentionally
— to the view that economics as
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a domain of thinking has a holistic character with evolutionary sorts of
dynamics. Consider the following two propositions which are arguably
implied by Blaug’s position regarding ‘lost content’. First, since lost
content is usually regarded as being ‘correct’ in some way when it is first
advanced, then ‘incorrect’ when it is later abandoned, and then once
again ‘correct’ when it gets rehabilitated, the standard for what counts as
a ‘correct’ idea or theory in economics is clearly changeable. Second,
since correctness is relative to the views that are dominant at any one
time — that any one set of theories and ideas can move back and forth
across correctness — implies that there must also be change in what kinds
of views are dominant in economics over time. These propositions
together, then, suggest that economics operates as a relatively closed
discourse which continually recycles relatively durable content, albeit in
changing ways.9 That is, were it not a relatively closed system in this
sense it seems unlikely that past ideas and theories would undergo
regular recovery and rehabilitation, on the grounds that substantial
changes in the nature and character of economic thinking would disrupt
the system of connections that keeps ‘incorrect’ ideas in play. Perhaps
such a view should be termed a ‘weak’ holism since change in those
ideas and theories that are dominant allows more space for bottom-up
change in ideas and theories.
That it was not Blaug’s explicit intention to reason in these terms
might be inferred from his longstanding commitment to the methodology
of Imre Lakatos’s scientific research program (SRP) approach (for
example Blaug 1992). But in his last statement on the subject he
advanced a generally holist view of Lakatos’s thinking, emphasizing that
Lakatos ‘denied that it was ever possible to judge an isolated theory;
what could be judged and appraised were clusters of more or less
interconnected theories, and it was these clusters that he labeled “scien
tific research programs” (Blaug 2010, p. 113). Moreover, in regard to
Lakatos’s treatment of ‘progressive’ and ‘degenerating’ changes in
research programs, Blaug pointed out that whether a given idea or theory
was one or the other depended on its relative performance over time. For
example, regarding the various assumptions behind the competitive
market ‘invisible hand’ theorem he argued:
If they are found to be false, this requires a revision of the ‘invisible hand’
theorem. They may be capable of being accommodated by suitable revision.
but only the track record of the research program in the face of possible
refutations will establish whether it is a ‘progressive’ or ‘degenerating’
SRP ... . The point is that the question of whether an SRP is ‘progressive’ or
‘degenerating’ has no ‘once-and-for-all’ answer. (Ibid., p. 114)
Thus it seems fair to say that there were evolutionary holist ideas in
Blaug’s thinking about the ways in which economics developed and
changed over time, despite the fact that he did not emphasize them
explicitly or apparently see himself as an evolutionary thinker per Se.
This then raises the question of how he saw his own role in regard to
the arguments he made about the historiography of economics. Were
those arguments, particularly as economics of scientific knowledge
arguments regarding the inefficiency of rational reconstructions of the
past, to be judged as merely relative to ‘clusters of more or less
interconnected theories’ about the historiography of economics, and so
perhaps to be seen as ‘correct’ at one time but then abandoned and
‘incorrect’ at another, perhaps to be rehabilitated and recovered again
later? This is the issue of reflexivity, or how one’s arguments regarding
methodological practice apply no less to one’s own arguments than to
those to whom they are directed. It is an issue particularly appropriate to
Blaug’s thinking because he casts his critique of rational reconstruction
in economic terms via the marketplace of ideas metaphor, and then uses
the ‘lost content’ idea to show that ideas and theories are ultimately
relative to changes in dominant thinking in economics. This then invites
those who would like to resist his critique of rational reconstruction to
argue that he has not advanced any definitive argument for historical
reconstruction. Indeed, if there is a general recycling of ideas and
theories in economics as might follow on his view, then one might say
that Whig type views of economics historiography should have their day
as frequently as Blaug’s preferred view of the history of economics.
One way to address this problem and escape the often paradoxical
aspects of the concept of reflexivity is by distinguishing different levels
in the application of the concept (Davis and Klaes, 2003). A first level of
reflexivity involves what may be called an ‘immanent’ reflexivity, where
ideas and theories not only refer to objects in the world but are also
self-referring. This is the case with the economics of scientific knowledge
as a particular approach in economic methodology, since economics is
being evaluated in terms of the concepts of economics. A second level of
reflexivity involves what may be called an ‘epistemic’ reflexivity, where
there is a relationship between a methodologist or epistemologist,
Blaug in this case, and the economics of scientific knowledge (itself
‘immanently’ reflexive) such that his own arguments refer not only to the
thinking of other economists but are also self-referring, as argued in the
previous paragraph. A third level of reflexivity involves what may be
called a ‘transcendent’ reflexivity, where we ourselves, economists gen
erally, and all those interested in the arguments concerning the role and
nature of the history of economic thought look upon Blaug’s
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a domain of thinking has a holistic character with evolutionary sorts of
dynamics. Consider the following two propositions which are arguably
implied by Blaug’s position regarding ‘lost content’. First, since lost
content is usually regarded as being ‘correct’ in some way when it is first
advanced, then ‘incorrect’ when it is later abandoned, and then once
again ‘correct’ when it gets rehabilitated, the standard for what counts as
a ‘correct’ idea or theory in economics is clearly changeable. Second,
since correctness is relative to the views that are dominant at any one
time — that any one set of theories and ideas can move back and forth
across correctness — implies that there must also be change in what kinds
of views are dominant in economics over time. These propositions
together, then, suggest that economics operates as a relatively closed
discourse which continually recycles relatively durable content, albeit in
changing ways.9 That is, were it not a relatively closed system in this
sense it seems unlikely that past ideas and theories would undergo
regular recovery and rehabilitation, on the grounds that substantial
changes in the nature and character of economic thinking would disrupt
the system of connections that keeps ‘incorrect’ ideas in play. Perhaps
such a view should be termed a ‘weak’ holism since change in those
ideas and theories that are dominant allows more space for bottom-up
change in ideas and theories.
That it was not Blaug’s explicit intention to reason in these terms
might be inferred from his longstanding commitment to the methodology
of Imre Lakatos’s scientific research program (SRP) approach (for
example Blaug 1992). But in his last statement on the subject he
advanced a generally holist view of Lakatos’s thinking, emphasizing that
Lakatos ‘denied that it was ever possible to judge an isolated theory;
what could be judged and appraised were clusters of more or less
interconnected theories, and it was these clusters that he labeled “scien
tific research programs” (Blaug 2010, p. 113). Moreover, in regard to
Lakatos’s treatment of ‘progressive’ and ‘degenerating’ changes in
research programs, Blaug pointed out that whether a given idea or theory
was one or the other depended on its relative performance over time. For
example, regarding the various assumptions behind the competitive
market ‘invisible hand’ theorem he argued:
If they are found to be false, this requires a revision of the ‘invisible hand’
theorem. They may be capable of being accommodated by suitable revision.
but only the track record of the research program in the face of possible
refutations will establish whether it is a ‘progressive’ or ‘degenerating’
SRP ... . The point is that the question of whether an SRP is ‘progressive’ or
‘degenerating’ has no ‘once-and-for-all’ answer. (Ibid., p. 114)
Thus it seems fair to say that there were evolutionary holist ideas in
Blaug’s thinking about the ways in which economics developed and
changed over time, despite the fact that he did not emphasize them
explicitly or apparently see himself as an evolutionary thinker per Se.
This then raises the question of how he saw his own role in regard to
the arguments he made about the historiography of economics. Were
those arguments, particularly as economics of scientific knowledge
arguments regarding the inefficiency of rational reconstructions of the
past, to be judged as merely relative to ‘clusters of more or less
interconnected theories’ about the historiography of economics, and so
perhaps to be seen as ‘correct’ at one time but then abandoned and
‘incorrect’ at another, perhaps to be rehabilitated and recovered again
later? This is the issue of reflexivity, or how one’s arguments regarding
methodological practice apply no less to one’s own arguments than to
those to whom they are directed. It is an issue particularly appropriate to
Blaug’s thinking because he casts his critique of rational reconstruction
in economic terms via the marketplace of ideas metaphor, and then uses
the ‘lost content’ idea to show that ideas and theories are ultimately
relative to changes in dominant thinking in economics. This then invites
those who would like to resist his critique of rational reconstruction to
argue that he has not advanced any definitive argument for historical
reconstruction. Indeed, if there is a general recycling of ideas and
theories in economics as might follow on his view, then one might say
that Whig type views of economics historiography should have their day
as frequently as Blaug’s preferred view of the history of economics.
One way to address this problem and escape the often paradoxical
aspects of the concept of reflexivity is by distinguishing different levels
in the application of the concept (Davis and Klaes, 2003). A first level of
reflexivity involves what may be called an ‘immanent’ reflexivity, where
ideas and theories not only refer to objects in the world but are also
self-referring. This is the case with the economics of scientific knowledge
as a particular approach in economic methodology, since economics is
being evaluated in terms of the concepts of economics. A second level of
reflexivity involves what may be called an ‘epistemic’ reflexivity, where
there is a relationship between a methodologist or epistemologist,
Blaug in this case, and the economics of scientific knowledge (itself
‘immanently’ reflexive) such that his own arguments refer not only to the
thinking of other economists but are also self-referring, as argued in the
previous paragraph. A third level of reflexivity involves what may be
called a ‘transcendent’ reflexivity, where we ourselves, economists gen
erally, and all those interested in the arguments concerning the role and
nature of the history of economic thought look upon Blaug’s
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historiographic view (the ‘epistemic’ level of reflexivity) and do so in a
self-referring way, or in a way that refers back upon us, since we are
concerned with the same historiographic issues.
Reflexivity exists at all three levels, then, but its paradoxical quality
dissipates as one moves from lower to higher levels. Thus it may seem
highly paradoxical in light of the evident circularity to say. at the
‘immanent’ level, that the meaning of ideas and theories in economics
derives from the meaning of those same ideas and theories. But this
difficulty is at least moderated when the methodologist or epistemologist,
who stands outside those ideas and theories, discusses at the ‘episternic’
level whether, when, and how successfully economic ideas and theories
can be used to evaluate the development of the field of economics
objectified as a type of scientific practice. Nonetheless there still remains
something problematic about ‘epistemic’ reflexivity where, as we saw
with Blaug, it is fair game to say that a particular methodology that is
grounded in certain ideas and theories ought to be judged by itself,
another evident circularity.
Considei then, how we might look upon Blaug’s position in ‘trans
cendent’ reflexivity terms. Here we focus not on the (‘epistemic’)
relationship between the particular methodologist Blaug and the views he
developed but rather on collections of individuals like Blaug, Samuelson,
Baumol, others, and ourselves, who are involved in seeking to explain a
type of disciplinary practice, namely the history of economic thought, as
it operates in the science of economics understood as one among many
kinds of social sciences. Here we place Blaug in this wider social context
in which at issue is not just his arguments regarding the status of the
history of economics but generally how the social science disciplines
function and ought to function. Blaug is still an historian and methodolo
gist of economics, and he still thinks in terms of a relatively closed
discourse in which he is expert. But our vantage point is now broader,
and the representative case he makes against the view most economists
defend regarding the historiography of economics is framed by how
sciences generally operate on such subjects as ‘lost content’ and change.
Thus, in light of the fact that Blaug uses economics of scientific
knowledge reasoning to evaluate economics on historiography, the reflex
ive aspects of his thinking need to be recognized and addressed. But
ultimately his case for the method of historical reconstruction is more
widely based and not really vulnerable to the circularity critique. In the
closing section, then, lessons from his case and arguments for the history
of economic thought are set out in relation to the issue of change in
recent economics.
12.5 HISTORY OF ECONOMICS AND THE CHANGE IN
ECONOMICS
As already noted, it is now widely recognized in the economics profes
sion that there has been considerable change in ideas, theories, methods.
and approaches in economics in the last decade or more. Perhaps not
surprisingly, this has given new impetus to appraisals of past ideas as
proponents of new research strategies interpret them in terms of past
ideas and theories (for example Bruni and Sugden 2007). In one sense,
this is consistent with Blaug’s view that the past can be recovered and
rehabilitated. It also fits his critique of the archaeological view of the
history of economic thought, where he argues that the past is not set in
stone and there simply to be uncovered, but is continually being
explained anew as continued research leads us to revise our past
historical thinking. But to the extent that these recent ‘recoveries’ are
rational reconstructions of the past, perhaps with Whig-type motivations,
they would be as objectionable to Blaug as views such as Samuelson’s
ultimately became for him. Nonetheless, might it be argued, with Blaug’s
implicit evolutionary vision of economics in mind, that there are grounds
for thinking that economists, especially those who are involved in new
research approaches and who often find themselves at odds with domin
ant views, are potentially more open to thinking that ‘correctness’ in
economics is relative, and consequently that the history of economics
could be valuable to understanding the development of economics as a
science? Certainly there are reasons not to be too optimistic on this score,
but it seems fitting in a discussion of Blaug’s contributions to the
historiography of economics to at least make the case for a more
optimistic scenario.
The argument, then, would be that the Samuelsonian idea that past
ideas and theories can and ought to be rationally reconstructed is no
longer nearly as credible as it was many years ago, that it has become
increasingly accepted that historical reconstruction is the proper form of
historiography, and, most importantly, that this all shows that economics
can lose content seen to be of continuing value. Why should we think
these three claims are true? First, rational reconstruction is now arguably
seen as a naïve method, one not seriously defended any longer by
economists, most of whom seem to have originally only followed the
lead of Samuelson, while being less competent than he was in arguing it,
and so are today not so much averse to the history of economics per se as
just interested in increasing training in mathematics and econometrics. At
the same time, whereas a leading historian of economics, Blaug, could
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historiographic view (the ‘epistemic’ level of reflexivity) and do so in a
self-referring way, or in a way that refers back upon us, since we are
concerned with the same historiographic issues.
Reflexivity exists at all three levels, then, but its paradoxical quality
dissipates as one moves from lower to higher levels. Thus it may seem
highly paradoxical in light of the evident circularity to say. at the
‘immanent’ level, that the meaning of ideas and theories in economics
derives from the meaning of those same ideas and theories. But this
difficulty is at least moderated when the methodologist or epistemologist,
who stands outside those ideas and theories, discusses at the ‘episternic’
level whether, when, and how successfully economic ideas and theories
can be used to evaluate the development of the field of economics
objectified as a type of scientific practice. Nonetheless there still remains
something problematic about ‘epistemic’ reflexivity where, as we saw
with Blaug, it is fair game to say that a particular methodology that is
grounded in certain ideas and theories ought to be judged by itself,
another evident circularity.
Considei then, how we might look upon Blaug’s position in ‘trans
cendent’ reflexivity terms. Here we focus not on the (‘epistemic’)
relationship between the particular methodologist Blaug and the views he
developed but rather on collections of individuals like Blaug, Samuelson,
Baumol, others, and ourselves, who are involved in seeking to explain a
type of disciplinary practice, namely the history of economic thought, as
it operates in the science of economics understood as one among many
kinds of social sciences. Here we place Blaug in this wider social context
in which at issue is not just his arguments regarding the status of the
history of economics but generally how the social science disciplines
function and ought to function. Blaug is still an historian and methodolo
gist of economics, and he still thinks in terms of a relatively closed
discourse in which he is expert. But our vantage point is now broader,
and the representative case he makes against the view most economists
defend regarding the historiography of economics is framed by how
sciences generally operate on such subjects as ‘lost content’ and change.
Thus, in light of the fact that Blaug uses economics of scientific
knowledge reasoning to evaluate economics on historiography, the reflex
ive aspects of his thinking need to be recognized and addressed. But
ultimately his case for the method of historical reconstruction is more
widely based and not really vulnerable to the circularity critique. In the
closing section, then, lessons from his case and arguments for the history
of economic thought are set out in relation to the issue of change in
recent economics.
12.5 HISTORY OF ECONOMICS AND THE CHANGE IN
ECONOMICS
As already noted, it is now widely recognized in the economics profes
sion that there has been considerable change in ideas, theories, methods.
and approaches in economics in the last decade or more. Perhaps not
surprisingly, this has given new impetus to appraisals of past ideas as
proponents of new research strategies interpret them in terms of past
ideas and theories (for example Bruni and Sugden 2007). In one sense,
this is consistent with Blaug’s view that the past can be recovered and
rehabilitated. It also fits his critique of the archaeological view of the
history of economic thought, where he argues that the past is not set in
stone and there simply to be uncovered, but is continually being
explained anew as continued research leads us to revise our past
historical thinking. But to the extent that these recent ‘recoveries’ are
rational reconstructions of the past, perhaps with Whig-type motivations,
they would be as objectionable to Blaug as views such as Samuelson’s
ultimately became for him. Nonetheless, might it be argued, with Blaug’s
implicit evolutionary vision of economics in mind, that there are grounds
for thinking that economists, especially those who are involved in new
research approaches and who often find themselves at odds with domin
ant views, are potentially more open to thinking that ‘correctness’ in
economics is relative, and consequently that the history of economics
could be valuable to understanding the development of economics as a
science? Certainly there are reasons not to be too optimistic on this score,
but it seems fitting in a discussion of Blaug’s contributions to the
historiography of economics to at least make the case for a more
optimistic scenario.
The argument, then, would be that the Samuelsonian idea that past
ideas and theories can and ought to be rationally reconstructed is no
longer nearly as credible as it was many years ago, that it has become
increasingly accepted that historical reconstruction is the proper form of
historiography, and, most importantly, that this all shows that economics
can lose content seen to be of continuing value. Why should we think
these three claims are true? First, rational reconstruction is now arguably
seen as a naïve method, one not seriously defended any longer by
economists, most of whom seem to have originally only followed the
lead of Samuelson, while being less competent than he was in arguing it,
and so are today not so much averse to the history of economics per se as
just interested in increasing training in mathematics and econometrics. At
the same time, whereas a leading historian of economics, Blaug, could
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entertain rational reconstruction at one point in his career, there are far
fewer historians of economics now who would take that view seriously.
Second, economists, even when they have no interest in the history of
economics, generally accept that historians of economics are expert in
their field, and recognize that the field has expanded in a research sense
with more publications and journals than previously. Thus if historians
with expert status defend historical reconstruction, likely economists
generally will take that to be the proper method. Third, the main feature
of the change in recent economics is a multiplication in research
approaches exhibiting considerable incommensurability with one another.
Supposing that economists increasingly recognize this, they should then
be aware that there are significant gaps in research, as is often manifest in
researchers’ successes in seizing upon unexploited subjects of investiga
tion, and thus be more open to the idea that valuable economic ideas and
theories may sometimes be missed, neglected, and sometimes also
recovered. In effect, then, Blaug’s inefficiency of the economics market
place idea is no longer really a very controversial idea among econo
mists.
This optimistic scenario, whereby the view of history of economic
thought in the economics profession has changed from what it was
previously, unfortunately does not imply that resources will flow to the
field or that it will make significant progress in the future in being
re-established in doctoral study. As worldwide there are fewer resources
directed to university training in general, fields such as the history of
economics which are not at the center of their subjects will continue to
face difficult times. But it may be taken nevertheless as a legacy of Mark
Blaug’s work as an economist, historian, and methodologist of economics
to have made a strong case for the field. And who would have been a
better person to have done so than one who admitted he had been wrong
about rational reconstruction because it failed by economists’ own
measure of policy, Pareto efficiency?
NOTES
* Thanks for comments without implication on a previous version of this chapter go to
Marcel Boumans, Tony Brewer, Bruce Caldwell, Zohreh Emami, Wade Hands,
Matthias Klaes, Harro Maas, Jack Vromen and Altug Yalcintas.
1. Rorty, whose concern was the history of philosophy, distinguished four genres of
historiography: Geistesgeschichten, historical reconstructions, rational reconstructions,
and doxographies (Rorty 1984). Blaug thought that “intellectual history” or “geistes
geschichte” ... virtually the same thing as what I call “historical reconstruction”
(Blaug 2001. p. 151). and the difference between doxography and rational construc
tions ‘at best a subtle one’ (Blaug 1990. p. 28). His main distinction across his two
papers, consequently, was the difference between rational reconstructions and histori
cal reconstructions.
2. A somewhat more blunt assessment of his view at this time was recorded later in his
1994 autobiographical remarks with respect to his historiographical stance in Eco
nomic Theory in Retrospect: ‘I announced myself an unapologetic absolutist and
poked fun at relativists throughout the hook. This is not a point of view I now hold,
having been upstaged over the years by even more strident upholders of the “Whig
interpretation of history” (Blaug 1994. p. 17).
3. It is worth noting that Blaug was also motivated to reconsider the merits of rational
reconstmction by his perception of the unhealthy emergence of formalism in eco
nomics (cf. Blaug 2003).
4. This was important to George Stigler’s position (cited by Blaug) in contrasting
‘personal exegesis’ and ‘scientific exegesis’ (Stigler 1965).
5. This subsequent exchange was stimulated by Samuelson’s reaction to Blaug’s (1990)
reflections on historiography and discussion of the exchange with Baumol. Samuelson
widened the exchange to include Patinkin, and their correspondence largely concerned
other issues in the history of economics.
6. Note that Imre Lakatos, who much influenced Blaug on the subject of the methodol
ogy of scientific research programs, had much earlier made related statements, arguing
that ‘any rational reconstruction needs to be supplemented by an empirical (socio
psychological) “external history” (Lakatos 1971, p. 91). Thus he wrote:
In this paper I have proposed a ‘historical’ method for the evaluation of rival
methodologies. The arguments were primarily addressed to the philosophers of
science and aimed at showing how he can — and should — learn from the history of
science. But the same arguments also imply that the historian of science must, in
turn, pay serious attention to the philosophy of science and decide upon which
methodology he will base his internal history. I hope to have offered some strong
arguments for the following theses. First, each methodology of science determines
a characteristic (and sharp) demarcation between (primary) internal history and
(secondary) external history and, secondly, both historians and philosophers of
science must make the best of the critical interplay between internal and external
factors. (Ibid., p. 122)
Blaug, however, does not seem to have cited this text. See Klaes (2003) for a
discussion of Lakatos’s view.
7. This was central to his critique of formalist general equilibrium theory (for example
Blaug 2003).
8. Thus on the one hand: ‘At long last, it can be said that the history of general
equilibrium theory from Walras to Arrow—Debreu has been a journey down a blind
alley’, whereas on the other hand: ‘General equilibrium theory, which had been dying
a slow death ever since Walras’s own death, was revived in the l930s’ (Blaug 2001,
p. 160).
9. This argument was also advanced in a somewhat different manner by Daniel Hausman
(1992).
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(Blaug 2001, p. 151), and the difference bet ee  doxography and rational construc-
tions 'at best a subtle one' (Blaug 1990, p.28). His main distinction across his two 
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entertain rational reconstruction at one point in his career, there are far
fewer historians of economics now who would take that view seriously.
Second, economists, even when they have no interest in the history of
economics, generally accept that historians of economics are expert in
their field, and recognize that the field has expanded in a research sense
with more publications and journals than previously. Thus if historians
with expert status defend historical reconstruction, likely economists
generally will take that to be the proper method. Third, the main feature
of the change in recent economics is a multiplication in research
approaches exhibiting considerable incommensurability with one another.
Supposing that economists increasingly recognize this, they should then
be aware that there are significant gaps in research, as is often manifest in
researchers’ successes in seizing upon unexploited subjects of investiga
tion, and thus be more open to the idea that valuable economic ideas and
theories may sometimes be missed, neglected, and sometimes also
recovered. In effect, then, Blaug’s inefficiency of the economics market
place idea is no longer really a very controversial idea among econo
mists.
This optimistic scenario, whereby the view of history of economic
thought in the economics profession has changed from what it was
previously, unfortunately does not imply that resources will flow to the
field or that it will make significant progress in the future in being
re-established in doctoral study. As worldwide there are fewer resources
directed to university training in general, fields such as the history of
economics which are not at the center of their subjects will continue to
face difficult times. But it may be taken nevertheless as a legacy of Mark
Blaug’s work as an economist, historian, and methodologist of economics
to have made a strong case for the field. And who would have been a
better person to have done so than one who admitted he had been wrong
about rational reconstruction because it failed by economists’ own
measure of policy, Pareto efficiency?
NOTES
* Thanks for comments without implication on a previous version of this chapter go to
Marcel Boumans, Tony Brewer, Bruce Caldwell, Zohreh Emami, Wade Hands,
Matthias Klaes, Harro Maas, Jack Vromen and Altug Yalcintas.
1. Rorty, whose concern was the history of philosophy, distinguished four genres of
historiography: Geistesgeschichten, historical reconstructions, rational reconstructions,
and doxographies (Rorty 1984). Blaug thought that “intellectual history” or “geistes
geschichte” ... virtually the same thing as what I call “historical reconstruction”
(Blaug 2001. p. 151). and the difference between doxography and rational construc
tions ‘at best a subtle one’ (Blaug 1990. p. 28). His main distinction across his two
papers, consequently, was the difference between rational reconstructions and histori
cal reconstructions.
2. A somewhat more blunt assessment of his view at this time was recorded later in his
1994 autobiographical remarks with respect to his historiographical stance in Eco
nomic Theory in Retrospect: ‘I announced myself an unapologetic absolutist and
poked fun at relativists throughout the hook. This is not a point of view I now hold,
having been upstaged over the years by even more strident upholders of the “Whig
interpretation of history” (Blaug 1994. p. 17).
3. It is worth noting that Blaug was also motivated to reconsider the merits of rational
reconstmction by his perception of the unhealthy emergence of formalism in eco
nomics (cf. Blaug 2003).
4. This was important to George Stigler’s position (cited by Blaug) in contrasting
‘personal exegesis’ and ‘scientific exegesis’ (Stigler 1965).
5. This subsequent exchange was stimulated by Samuelson’s reaction to Blaug’s (1990)
reflections on historiography and discussion of the exchange with Baumol. Samuelson
widened the exchange to include Patinkin, and their correspondence largely concerned
other issues in the history of economics.
6. Note that Imre Lakatos, who much influenced Blaug on the subject of the methodol
ogy of scientific research programs, had much earlier made related statements, arguing
that ‘any rational reconstruction needs to be supplemented by an empirical (socio
psychological) “external history” (Lakatos 1971, p. 91). Thus he wrote:
In this paper I have proposed a ‘historical’ method for the evaluation of rival
methodologies. The arguments were primarily addressed to the philosophers of
science and aimed at showing how he can — and should — learn from the history of
science. But the same arguments also imply that the historian of science must, in
turn, pay serious attention to the philosophy of science and decide upon which
methodology he will base his internal history. I hope to have offered some strong
arguments for the following theses. First, each methodology of science determines
a characteristic (and sharp) demarcation between (primary) internal history and
(secondary) external history and, secondly, both historians and philosophers of
science must make the best of the critical interplay between internal and external
factors. (Ibid., p. 122)
Blaug, however, does not seem to have cited this text. See Klaes (2003) for a
discussion of Lakatos’s view.
7. This was central to his critique of formalist general equilibrium theory (for example
Blaug 2003).
8. Thus on the one hand: ‘At long last, it can be said that the history of general
equilibrium theory from Walras to Arrow—Debreu has been a journey down a blind
alley’, whereas on the other hand: ‘General equilibrium theory, which had been dying
a slow death ever since Walras’s own death, was revived in the l930s’ (Blaug 2001,
p. 160).
9. This argument was also advanced in a somewhat different manner by Daniel Hausman
(1992).
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13. An unrepentant Lakatosian
Marcel Boumans*
13.1 INTRODUCTION
It would be much too strong calling Mark Blaug’s overall approach a
‘research program’, nevertheless there is quite some coherence and
continuity with respect to a few themes with which one could character
ize his work throughout his professional life. One of these themes, ‘rigor
versus relevance’, was most dominant in the last ten years of his life. So,
though this theme was most prominent in the last period of his profes
sional life, you can see — by hindsight — that it has always been one of his
major concerns. Already his very first publication (1956), dealing with
the empirical content of Ricardian economics, contains the key elements
of the later ‘rigor versus relevance’ debate:
My purpose here is to show, first of all, that the body of doctrine which
Ricardo bequeathed to his followers rested on a series of definite predictions
about the course of economic events which were subject to empirical
verification, in the strictest sense of the term. Second, I shall try to show that
the statistical data and methods of the time, crude as they may have been,
were adequate to test the validity of Ricardian theory, in terms of its
predictive accuracy for the class of phenomena which it was intended to
explain, and, moreover, that such evidence was within the purview of all the
economists of the day. Lastly, I shall argue that few of the classical thinkers
were willing to surrender economic propositions on the grounds that they
were contradicted by the available evidence; but, I stress, this had nothing to
do with lack of empirical information. (Blaug 1956, p. 41)
Ricardian theory is not a deductive, ‘empirically empty’, theory but has
empirical content because it can be tested in terms of its predictive
accuracy.
According to Blaug (1998, 2003a, 2003b, 2009, 2010a; Sharp 1998),
relevance means having empirical content and being capable of answer
ing any practical question, whereas rigor is taken as a synonym of
irrelevance, associated with empty formalism. Rigor and relevance are
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